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ABSTRACT: Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, 
and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill 
the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The 
central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory 
posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely 
pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from 
knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant 
knowledge-centered accounts.  
 
 
Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, 
action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically 
successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn 
generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological 
Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-
centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely 
pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms 
distinct from knowledge. 
I do not argue for this view from scratch, however. From the outset, I assume the truth 
of the Knowledge Account, according to which an assertion, action, or belief has a certain 
positive epistemic status central to ordinary practice, which I noncommittally call okayness, iff 
it is appropriately related to knowledge. Others have assembled impressive evidence in support 
of this core idea, evidence which I rehearse only in the interest of bringing relevant information 
to the forefront of the reader’s mind (§1). Here I focus solely on the following guiding question: 
what is the best version of the Knowledge Account, i.e., what is the best understanding of 
okayness? The reader ought not be fooled by the apparent narrowness of this question, for in 
answering it I offer an ambitious and innovative account of the structure of epistemic 
normativity.  
Toward the end of finding the best understanding of okayness, I begin with the simplest 
approaches, moving to more complex ones only if these prove inadequate. In the case at hand, 
the simplest approach is to identify okayness with some well-understood positive normative 
status such as permissibility, goodness, or success. The identification of okayness with 
permissibility yields a broadly deontological theory, but I show that, given a minimal 
assumption, this theory has the bitter consequence that a belief is epistemically justified only if 
it is knowledge (§2). The identification of okayness with goodness, meanwhile, yields a broadly 
axiological theory, but I show that this theory rules out plausible claims about epistemic goods 
besides knowledge – goods like truth and epistemic justification – while a more permissive 
variant of the theory cannot explain the distinctive normative salience of knowledge (§3).  
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I instead endorse the identification of okayness with success, which yields the 
Teleological Account. I argue for this account by inference to the best explanation, taking as 
explananda both the original data motivating the Knowledge Account and the data yielded by 
the failures of the deontological and axiological approaches (§4-§5). After elaborating the 
Teleological Account by locating two possible sources of epistemic teleology (§6), I conclude 
that it is the best version of the Knowledge Account (§7). 
 
 
1. The Knowledge Account 
 
A primary motivation for the Knowledge Account is the pervasiveness of references to knowledge in 
our ordinary epistemic assessments, so I begin by programmatically reviewing a sample of these 
references en route to the Knowledge Account itself. In addition, while many have offered one 
piece or another of the account, I find it most compelling as a whole and will present it as such. 
The following data relate knowledge to assertion: 
 
(A1) ‘How do you know that?’ standardly insinuates a negative assessment of an 
assertion. ‘You don’t know that!’ standardly gives outright expression to a 
negative assessment of an assertion. 
(A2) Any assertion of the form ‘p and I don’t know that p’ is infelicitous, even when 
such an assertion is true and supported by substantial evidence.  
(A3) Suppose I have purchased a single ticket for a fair lottery with a thousand tickets, 
each of which has an equal chance of winning. Unbeknownst to me, the winning 
ticket has already been drawn, and it is not mine. Call this the Lottery Case. It 
is infelicitous for me to assert, ‘My ticket has lost the lottery,’ even though this 
assertion is not only true, but also overwhelmingly probable given my evidence. 
(A4) ‘Do you know . . . ?’ is a standard prompt for assertion. For instance, if I wish to 
prompt you to make an assertion about where the train station is, I might ask, 
‘Do you know where the train station is?’1 
 
Roughly parallel data relate knowledge to reasons for action2: 
 
(R1) Suppose that on the way home from work, I drive towards the interstate, which 
often becomes congested with traffic. ‘Do you know that this is the best way 
home?’ standardly insinuates a negative assessment. ‘You know this isn’t the 
best way home!’ standardly gives outright expression to a negative assessment. 
(R2) It is always problematic to treat p and I don’t know that p as a reason for action. 
(R3) In the Lottery Case, it is problematic for me to treat the proposition that my ticket 
has lost as a reason for action, even though this proposition is both true and 
overwhelmingly probable given my evidence. 
(R4) When we deliberate about what to do, a standard starting point is to review 
what we know.3 
 
A third strand of roughly parallel data relates knowledge to belief: 
                                                 
1 Williamson (2000) calls attention to (A1)-(A3) and Turri (2010) calls attention to (A4). 
2 For brevity, I will usually omit the phrase “reasons for.” 
3 Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) call attention to (R1)-(R3). 
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(B1) ‘How do you know that p?’ standardly insinuates a negative assessment of the 
assertion, ‘I believe that p.’4 ‘You don’t know that p!’ standardly gives outright 
expression to a negative assessment. 
(B2) It is always problematic to believe that p and I don’t know that p, even if this belief 
is true and well-supported by evidence. 
(B3) Suppose that in the Lottery Case I truly believe that my ticket has lost. My belief, 
though supported by substantial evidence, is problematic; the boldest non-
problematic belief would be that my ticket has very likely lost.  
(B4) There is something problematic about true justified beliefs that fall short of 
knowledge, as in Gettier cases.5 
 
These data may be explained by the hypothesis that knowledge is a norm of assertion, action, 
and belief. On this hypothesis, if I know that p, then my assertion that p, my treatment of p as a 
reason for action, or my belief that p satisfies this norm and is thus (let’s noncommittally say) 
okay, and if I do not know that p, then my assertion that p, my treatment of p as a reason for 
action, or my belief that p violates this norm and is thus not okay. I stipulate that the 
assessment ‘okay’ is always positive, but whether the assessment ‘not okay’ is sometimes 
neutral or always negative I leave as a substantive question. 
 Notably, assertion6 is also normatively connected to items other than knowledge, such 
as belief, truth, evidence, reasons, and justification. For example, it is natural to express a 
negative assessment of an assertion by saying, ‘You don’t really believe that,’ ‘That’s not true,’ 
‘You don’t have any evidence for that,’ etc. However, the present hypothesis predicts such 
patterns. After all, if I know that p, then I must believe that p; p must be true; and I must have 
evidence, reasons, and justification for believing that p. Given the presupposition that 
knowledge requires belief, a negative assessment like ‘You don’t really believe that’ thus entails 
the negative assessment ‘You don’t know that.’ By contrast, it is difficult to explain the 
normative significance of knowledge via the claim that belief, truth, evidence, reasons, or 
justification set a norm of assertion, for none of these require knowledge.7 
This hypothesis requires two refinements. First, assertions, actions, and beliefs are 
normatively assessable in a variety of ways that have little to do with knowledge: they may be 
kind or cruel, polite or rude, funny or dull. So knowledge is not the sole norm against which 
assertions are measured. Instead, norms come in distinctive clusters, one of which is epistemic. 
The difference between epistemic and non-epistemic norms can be brought out by well-worn 
examples, like the example of a patient who believes without evidence that she will recover 
from a serious illness and whose belief in fact helps her recover: her belief satisfies certain non-
epistemic norms but violates certain epistemic norms. According to the present hypothesis, a 
central part of this epistemic cluster of norms is the knowledge norm, against which assertions, 
actions, and beliefs are measured. 
Second, knowledge can be problematically disconnected from assertion, action, or belief. 
Consider Marvin, whose job is to direct tourists to the Big Burger Bistro. Marvin stands south 
of the Big Burger Bistro, pretending to give tourists directions when he in fact dishonestly 
                                                 
4 Sometimes we say ‘I believe that p’ to make a hedged assertion that p, but I stipulate that this is not occurring 
here. 
5 Gettier (1963). 
6 Parallel remarks apply to action and belief. 
7 Assertion is also normatively connected to certainty, as assertions are sometimes naturally met with responses 
like, “Are you sure?” See Turri (2010) for a suggestion on how to square this with the Knowledge Account. 
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directs every tourist north. Thus, when a tourist asks Marvin how to get to the vegan Candle 
Café, which Marvin knows is to the north, Marvin replies with feigned cheer, ‘Just head north!’ 
with the sole intention of directing the tourist to the Big Burger Bistro. Even though Marvin 
asserts what he knows, his assertion is not epistemically okay because of its disconnection –  
causal, counterfactual, and otherwise – from his knowledge. Such disconnections between a 
subject’s assertion that p and her knowledge that p may occur for any number of reasons, 
including ulterior motives, carelessness, or a momentary lapse of memory. 
This structure is familiar throughout the normative realm. While being ethically 
required to recycle, I might do so solely to keep up appearances; while having most reason to 
believe that my dog is more clever than yours, I might believe this merely because I love my 
dog. The solution, too, is familiar: to require an appropriate connection. For assertion and the 
treatment of items8 as reasons for action, the connection is proper basing. Accordingly, call an 
assertion that p or treatment of p as a reason for action knowledge-based just in case it is 
properly based on knowledge that p. On the present hypothesis, an assertion or treatment of a 
reason for action is epistemically okay just in case it is knowledge-based.9 For belief, the proper 
connection is simply identity: on the present hypothesis, a belief is epistemically okay just in 
case it is knowledge.10 For convenience, I will also disjunctively define the term knowledgeable: 
an item is knowledgeable iff it is a knowledge-based assertion or action or a belief that is 
knowledge. 
We now arrive at the unified Knowledge Account: 
 
Knowledge Account of Assertion: An assertion that p is epistemically okay iff this 
assertion is knowledge-based. 11,12 
 
Knowledge Account of Action: A treatment of p as a reason for action is epistemically 
okay iff this treatment is knowledge-based. 13,14,15 
                                                 
8 I use the term ‘item’ as a catch-all sortal, covering states, events, objects, etc. 
9 Turri (2011) makes a similar point. 
10 Perhaps beliefs are never knowledge; perhaps beliefs are at best a proper part of knowledge, or perhaps there are 
belief types but no belief tokens. My core claims can be paraphrased to fit such views, though for simplicity I will 
continue to speak as though an identity obtains between every instance of knowledge and the associated belief. 
11 Williamson (2000, ch. 11) provides the now-canonical defense of this account. Related accounts appear in Moore 
(1962), Unger (1975), Slote (1979), and DeRose (1991). 
12 Perhaps knowledge is the constitutive norm of assertion. On this stronger hypothesis, something is an assertion 
wholly in virtue of being subject to the Knowledge Account of Assertion, just as something is a game of chess 
wholly in virtue of being subject to the rules of chess (Williamson (2000, ch. 11)). 
13 Fantl and McGrath (2002) suggest that if I know that p, then it should not be a problem for me to act as if p, 
which approximates the right-to-left direction of the Knowledge Account of Action. Similarly, Hawthorne and 
Stanley (2008) defend something much like the Knowledge Account of Action, but their account is restricted to p-
dependent choices. (Hawthorne (2004) contains a less-developed version of this account.) A choice between 
actions x1 . . . xn is p-dependent just in case the most preferable of x1 . . . xn given that p differs from the most 
preferable of x1 . . . xn given that not-p. This restriction is designed to avoid cases where p is completely irrelevant 
to one’s choice of action. However, this restriction is unnecessary. To be sure, when p is completely irrelevant to 
one’s choice of action, it will typically be unhelpful and therefore misleading to say that one treated p as a reason 
for action, for one ought to discuss only relevant reasons for action. Nevertheless, when p is irrelevant, there is no 
harm in letting the treatment of p as a reason for action be trivially epistemically okay. 
14 Note that the Knowledge Account of Action does not entail the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Admittedly, 
assertion is an action, so the Knowledge Account of Action entails that treating p as a reason for asserting that q is 
epistemically okay iff this treatment of p is knowledge-based. However, it does not follow that asserting that q is 
epistemically okay iff this assertion that q is knowledge-based. Brown (2012, 130-134) helpfully elaborates on this 
point. 
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Knowledge Account of Belief: A belief that p is epistemically okay iff this belief is 
knowledge.16 
 
In short, an assertion, action, or belief is epistemically okay iff it is knowledgeable. 
The Knowledge Account applies only to existing assertions, treatments of reasons for 
action, and beliefs, not to merely potential ones. Moving from a theory of the former to a theory 
of the latter is surprisingly difficult.17 To mention just one hurdle, even if I know that I have 
never mentioned the word ‘assertion,’ it is not epistemically okay for me to assert, ‘I have never 
mentioned the word “assertion.”’ 
The Knowledge Account cleanly explains the above data. Because these explanations 
run almost in parallel, here I will discuss only the assertion data: 
 
(KA1) ‘How do you know that?’ often implicates that you do not (or might not) know 
that. If you do not know that, then your assertion is not epistemically okay, so 
the question often implicates that your assertion is not (or might not be) 
epistemically okay and hence insinuates a negative assessment. ‘You don’t know 
that!’ entails that your assertion is not knowledge-based and thus not 
epistemically okay. That expresses a negative assessment outright. 
(KA2) For the assertion ‘p and I don’t know that p’ to be epistemically okay, I must 
know that p, and I must also know that I don’t know that p. But given the 
factivity of knowledge, that is impossible. So any assertion of the form ‘p and I 
don’t know that p’ is not epistemically okay.  
(KA3) In the Lottery Case, though I have strong evidence that my ticket has lost the 
lottery, I still do not know this. So my assertion is not epistemically okay. 
(KA4) An epistemically okay assertion that p requires the speaker to know that p, so by 
asserting that p, one implicates that one knows that p. Typically, when I prompt 
an assertion by asking, ‘Do you know whether p?,’ it is common ground (and 
arguably common knowledge) that I am not interested merely in whether or not 
you know whether p. Given that knowledge is the epistemic norm of assertion, a 
question like ‘Do you know where the train station is?’ implicates which speech 
act I would like you to perform: an assertion about the location of the train 
station. 
 
Taking for granted the truth of the Knowledge Account, I ask: What is the best version of it?18 
Answering this question requires finding the best understanding of okayness, and the simplest 
approach is to identify this property with a familiar positive normative property such as 
permissibility, goodness, or success. In the next three sections, I examine these identifications 
in turn. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 On a credence-oriented approach, there are substantial normative links between one’s rational credences (i.e., 
degrees of belief) and one’s reasons for action. The Knowledge Account of Action is silent about the credence-
oriented approach, for it is silent about credences. But Moss (2013) and Weisberg (2013) suggest ways of 
combining the Knowledge Account of Action with the credence-oriented approach. 
16 Williamson (2000, p. 11) expresses sympathy for this account, and Sutton (2005) endorses it. 
17 As Whitcomb (forthcoming) shows. 
18 For notable critiques of the Knowledge Account of Assertion, see Weiner (2005), Lackey (2007), Brown (2008a), 
Stanley (2008), Sosa (2009), Brown (2010), and Maitra and Weatherson (2010). For notable critiques of the 
Knowledge Account of Action, see Brown (2008b), Neta (2009), Lackey (2010), and Gerken (2011). 
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I will pay particular attention to the Knowledge Account of Belief, which is 
representative in that almost all of my remarks about it can be recast mutatis mutandis as 
remarks directly about the Knowledge Account of Assertion or Action. As it happens, I also 
regard the Knowledge Account of Belief as the linchpin of the Knowledge Account. For I take 
assertion to be the speech act with the function of expressing belief, and I further take belief in 
a proposition to underpin the treatment of that proposition as a reason for action, so I hold that 
assertion and the treatment of propositions as reasons for action inherit the epistemic norms 
applying to belief. But I will not rely on this further view.19 
 
 
2. The Deontological Account 
 
The Deontological Account identifies okayness with permissibility:  
 
Assertion Deontology: An assertion that p is epistemically permissible iff this assertion 
is knowledge-based. 
 
Action Deontology: A treatment of p as a reason for action is epistemically permissible 
iff this treatment is knowledge-based. 
 
Belief Deontology: A belief that p is epistemically permissible iff this belief is 
knowledge. 
 
The great popularity of this account is understandable.20 For among the most common norms 
of ordinary life are rules expressing what is permissible, required, or forbidden – codes of law, 
of etiquette, of professional conduct. It is natural, then, to conceive of the Knowledge Account 
as expressing rules of a similar stripe in the epistemic domain. 
But, focusing as promised on the case of belief, I will argue that the Deontological 
Account offers far too restrictive a conception of epistemic permissibility. Consider: 
 
Belief-Belief Link: If a belief that p is epistemically justified, then this belief is 
epistemically permissible. 
 
I adopt this as a partial stipulation of the meaning of the technical term ‘epistemic 
justification.’21 I prefer this more complete stipulation: 
 
Biconditional Belief-Belief Link: A belief that p is epistemically permissible iff this 
belief is epistemically justified. 
 
                                                 
19 For skepticism about the unity of the epistemic norms of assertion, action, and belief, see Stanley (2008) and 
Brown (2012). 
20  Defenders of Assertion Deontology include Williamson (2000). Defenders of Action Deontology include 
Hawthorne (2004) and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008). Defenders of Belief Deontology include Sutton (2005) and, 
more tentatively, Williamson (2000). 
21 For those who prefer a different stipulation, I can recast the argument below as follows while bypassing any talk 
of epistemic justification: if Belief Deontology is true, then it is epistemically permissible to have a false belief based 
on mountains of misleading evidence, and the Gettiered subject’s belief is epistemically impermissible. But both of 
these beliefs plainly are epistemically permissible, so Belief Deontology is false. 
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But my argument requires only the simple Belief-Belief Link.  
This principle, when conjoined with the left-to-right direction of Belief Deontology, 
immediately entails that if a belief that p is epistemically justified, then this belief is knowledge; 
that is, a belief is epistemically justified only if it is knowledge. Yet this is manifestly false. For 
some false beliefs are epistemically justified, as when one has mountains of evidence which 
uniformly point in the wrong direction, and some epistemically justified true beliefs are not 
knowledge, as Gettier cases illustrate.22  To say that justification requires knowledge is to 
ignore some of our strongest and most stable epistemic intuitions.23 
Perhaps the deontologist will reply that beliefs falling short of knowledge are never fully 
epistemically justified but may still be partially epistemically justified.24 Introducing graded 
epistemic justification alongside epistemic justification simpliciter does not help, however, for 
the Gettiered subject has epistemic justification simpliciter. Since she lacks full epistemic 
justification, epistemic justification simpliciter cannot require full epistemic justification; it must 
require only partial epistemic justification. Further, given the Belief-Belief Link, the Gettiered 
subject’s belief is epistemically permissible. Belief Deontology then falsely entails that her belief 
is knowledge. 
The deontologist may also suggest that I have confused excusability with permissibility: 
while the belief of the Gettiered subject is entirely excusable, it is also impermissible.25 But this 
reply runs together two distinct epistemic statuses, as the delusive beliefs of a psychiatric 
patient may be excusable despite being epistemically impermissible. Nor is it fruitful for the 
deontologist to distinguish epistemic from non-epistemic excusability with the hope of 
identifying the former as the relevant status of Gettiered belief, since this approach similarly 
conflates two distinct epistemic statuses. For instance, Andrew Wiles’ lengthy initial ‘proof’ of 
Fermat’s Last Theorem contained a subtle gap which he was perfectly capable of recognizing 
but did not. Wiles’ belief, before the discovery of the gap, that he proved Fermat’s Last 
Theorem is a paradigm of an epistemically excusable but impermissible belief, the excuse being 
that the attempted proof was complex and the flaw subtle. But this is not the positive epistemic 
status we accord to the beliefs of Gettiered subjects.  
Gettiered beliefs, unlike merely excusable beliefs, are formed by epistemically proper 
internal processes. I say little about what makes an internal process epistemically proper – 
perhaps it must fit the subject’s evidence, 26  or reliably produce true beliefs in typical 
environments,27 or be internally like a knowledge-producing process28 – and I thus do not say 
whether all intrinsic duplicates must be alike with respect to the property of using an 
epistemically proper internal process. But I do say that this property suffices for epistemic 
justification and hence for epistemic permissibility. I would add that with respect to a Gettiered 
belief, the subject is not only exempt from epistemic blame but also merits epistemic praise, as 
from an epistemic perspective the subject’s method of belief formation deserves active 
reinforcement. 
                                                 
22 Gettier (1963). Many who defend parts of the Knowledge Account explicitly rely on the view that Gettier cases 
exist – most prominently, Williamson (2000).  
23 For criticisms in the same vein, see Jackson (2012), Smithies (2012), Cohen and Comesaña (2013), and Turri 
(2014). 
24 Williamson (2013a) and (2013b) defends this view. 
25 For attempts to explain certain judgments of acceptability in terms of excusability rather than permissibility, see 
Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Hellie (2011), Leite (2013), and Williamson (2013b). 
26 See Conee and Feldman (1985). 
27 See Goldman (1979). 
28 See Bird (2007). 
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The brave-hearted theorist may consistently retain Belief Deontology simply by 
denying one or more premises of this argument, 29  but she should at least admit that her 
position is counterintuitive. For Gettier cases are among the paradigms of epistemic justification: 
as a matter of sociology, such cases have overwhelmingly persuaded the philosophical 
community that true justified belief does not suffice for knowledge. The appeal of Belief 
Deontology lies not in its stringent conception of justification, but in its ability to explain the 
compelling data about the epistemic centrality of knowledge. If we can explain these data 
without the deontologist’s procrustean methods, as I will ultimately argue that we can, then 
Belief Deontology is obsolete.30 
 
 
3. Two axiological accounts 
 
Knowledge is an epistemic good, so of course a knowledgeable belief is epistemically good. 
Arguably, so too are knowledge-based assertions and actions, for do they not shine with the 
borrowed light of the underlying knowledge? These observations motivate the Strict 
Axiological Account, which identifies okayness with goodness: 
 
Strict Assertion Axiology: An assertion that p is epistemically good iff this assertion is 
knowledge-based.31 
 
Strict Action Axiology: A treatment of p as a reason for action is epistemically good iff 
this treatment is knowledge-based. 
 
Strict Belief Axiology: A belief that p is epistemically good iff this belief is knowledge. 
 
I will focus on Strict Belief Axiology, which has one notable advantage. Recall the Belief-Belief 
Link, which says that if a belief that p is epistemically justified, then this belief is epistemically 
permissible. Belief Deontology, as we have seen, is incompatible with this principle, but Strict 
Belief Axiology can accommodate it. For permissibility in some domain does not require 
goodness in that domain; something may be neutral or bad, but still permissible, in a given 
domain,32 as is perhaps illustrated in the ethical domain by a failure to develop one’s talents out 
of sheer laziness. The strict axiologist may therefore hold that a Gettiered belief that p, while 
perfectly epistemically permissible, is nonetheless not epistemically good because it is not 
knowledge. And indeed a Gettiered belief that p would plausibly have been epistemically better 
had it been knowledge that p.33 The Strict Axiological Account thus appears to have much to 
recommend it. 
                                                 
29 Sutton (2005) heroically defends Belief Deontology, and Williamson speculates that the left-to-right direction of 
Belief Deontology holds (2000, p. 11). Both simply deny that beliefs falling short of knowledge are ever 
epistemically permissible (Williamson (2013b, p. 92)). Meanwhile, Weatherson (2003) flirts with rejecting the 
existence of Gettier cases. 
30 Perhaps some even find it intuitive that justification requires knowledge. While I amicably admit that I cannot 
persuade such theorists, they may still wish to see how best to square the predominant intuition about justification, 
which they do not share, with the Knowledge Account. 
31 Turri (2014) meticulously defends a view very similar to the left-to-right direction of Assertion Axiology. My 
arguments below will undermine even this weaker position. 
32 As Turri (2014) nicely brings out.  
33 For similar reasons, Assertion Axiology is perfectly compatible with the Biconditional Belief-Assertion Linking 
Principle, and Action Axiology is perfectly compatible with the Biconditional Belief-Action Linking Principle. 
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Unfortunately, the Strict Axiological Account is difficult to reconcile with other facts 
about epistemic goods. Truth is a paradigmatic epistemic good, so true beliefs that fall short of 
knowledge may presumably be epistemically good. Similarly, justification is an epistemic good, 
and accordingly justified beliefs that fall short of knowledge may also be epistemically good. 
Perhaps such beliefs are not as epistemically good as beliefs that are knowledge, but they may 
surely be at least somewhat epistemically good. 
The strict axiologist might reply that though truth and justification are epistemic goods, 
falling short of knowledge is epistemically bad enough to outweigh these epistemic goods, so 
true justified beliefs falling short of knowledge are not epistemically good overall. This parallels 
the ethical consequentialist’s claim that due to the ethical goodness of pleasure and the 
epistemic badness of pain, taking mild sadistic pleasure in the great pain of another is ethically 
bad overall, as the situation involves a balance of pain over pleasure. 
While this strategy might be plausible in particular cases, there is no reason to accept it 
in general, for there is no reason to think that falling short of knowledge is always 
epistemically bad. The strict axiologist might infer this from the platitude that having 
knowledge is epistemically good. But in general it is fallacious to infer from the premise that all 
items having a particular property are good to the conclusion that all items lacking that 
property are bad, e.g., from the premise that paintings by Monet are aesthetically good to the 
conclusion that paintings not by Monet are aesthetically bad. For an item may have other 
good-making properties, and lacking the relevant property may also be merely neutral rather 
than bad.  
Further, even if falling short of knowledge is always epistemically bad, the objection is 
not yet answered. The strict axiologist must further hold that this epistemic badness always 
outweighs the epistemic goodness of truth and justification. For if not, then some true justified 
beliefs falling short of knowledge will still be epistemically good overall, despite the epistemic 
badness of falling short of knowledge. But there is no obvious reason why falling short of 
knowledge must always be so epistemically bad as to outweigh the epistemic goods of truth and 
justification. 
The Strict Axiological Account recognizes the distinctive value of knowledge, but only 
at the expense of neglecting the value of other central epistemic goods. Perhaps the following 
Permissive Axiological Account, which identifies epistemic okayness with a particular degree 
of epistemic goodness, can do better: 
 
Permissive Assertion Axiology: An assertion that p is epistemically good to a 
particular degree iff this assertion is knowledge-based. 
 
Permissive Action Axiology: A treatment of p as a reason for action is epistemically 
good to a particular degree iff this treatment is knowledge-based. 
 
Permissive Belief Axiology: A belief that p is epistemically good to a particular degree 
iff this belief is knowledge. 
 
This account avoids the problems just raised for its stricter cousin, for it is compatible with the 
claim that true or justified beliefs which fall short of knowledge may be at least somewhat 
epistemically good overall. The Permissive Axiological Account entails only that such beliefs 
do not reach the particular degree of goodness of their knowledgeable counterparts.34 
                                                 
34 Recall that an item is knowledgeable iff it is a knowledge-based assertion or action or a belief that is knowledge. 
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 The acceptability of even this consequence is unclear. For compare, on the one hand, my 
knowledgeable belief that my car is in the parking lot, and on the other hand, a Gettiered true 
belief supported by extensive observational data which unifies theoretical physics. Setting aside 
any antecedent commitments to a particular theory of epistemic goodness, I find it difficult to 
judge which of these beliefs is epistemically better, and I feel stirrings of doubt even about the 
idea that there exists only a single axis of epistemic goodness along which these beliefs are to 
be ranked. Aren’t these beliefs simply epistemically good in distinct and incomparable respects? 
But I will bracket these concerns for the moment, as the Permissive Axiological 
Account suffers from a more obvious defect: it is so permissive that it can no longer explain the 
distinctive normative salience of knowledge. By analogy, consider point-scoring in basketball. 
Scoring at least 73 points is always good to at least a particular degree, and always better than 
many other scores. But we do not single out this score, or any other for that matter, for special 
normative attention. To do so would be deeply arbitrary and therefore silly. Hence, the 
property of being good to a particular degree does not always warrant special normative emphasis. 
Knowledge is not only normatively salient, but also far more normatively salient than 
countless other epistemic properties, as evidenced by the data in §1. But the Permissive 
Axiological Account cannot explain this special emphasis, given that knowledgeable beliefs fall 
in the middle of a long scale of epistemic goodness. On one side, true or justified but non-
knowledgeable beliefs, while epistemically good, are not as epistemically good as 
knowledgeable beliefs, and on the other side, some knowledgeable beliefs are epistemically 
better than others: knowledge based on overwhelming evidence from many sources is 
epistemically better than knowledge based on merely solid evidence from a single source. But 
the Permissive Axiological Account alone cannot explain why we single out the particular 
degree of goodness reached by knowledgeable beliefs over the arbitrarily many other 
surrounding degrees of goodness. 
To be clear, I suspect but have not tried to argue that the Permissive Axiological 
Account is false; my account below will even be perfectly compatible with its truth. But I object 
that, even if true, it cannot explain why prizing knowledge is not as arbitrary, and as silly, as 
prizing basketball scores of 73 points or more. 
 
 
4. The Teleological Account 
 
So far, I have argued that our epistemic assessments of belief, and by extension assertion and 
action, fall into at least four distinct categories. 
First, as evidenced by the data in §1, we make the binary rather than degreed distinction 
between knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable beliefs. When a subject fails this normative test, 
the flaw is sometimes hers, as in cases of careless reasoning, and sometimes in her environment 
or her connection to that environment, as in Gettier cases. Regardless, we pay keen attention to 
knowledge and organize many of our normative assessments around it. 
Second, we make the further binary distinction between knowledgeable beliefs, Gettiered 
beliefs, etc., and beliefs generated by wishful thinking, fallacious inference, etc. In so doing, we focus on 
whether or not the subject formed her belief via an epistemically proper internal process. This 
distinction differs from the previous one in that Gettiered beliefs are on the positive side of the 
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ledger here, since they are properly formed,35 and in that when the subject fails this test, the 
flaw is always hers. 
Third and relatedly, when the subject fails this second test, we look for extenuating 
circumstances – perhaps the fatigue of a long day, the complexity of the problem at hand, or the 
indoctrination of ignorant parents – for her failure. If she is in circumstances like these, we do 
not (in our reasonable moments at least) hold her fully accountable; otherwise we do. Either 
way, however, we say that the flaw is in her cognitive system. 
Fourth, we mark salient positive epistemic properties which a particular belief might or 
might not reflect, including truth, justification, knowledge, evidence, thoroughness in gathering 
evidence, etc. We can readily rank two such properties whenever having one entails but is not 
entailed by having the other – more justification is always better, and knowledge is always 
better than mere justified belief. But some rankings are harder to come by: it is difficult to say 
whether a justified false belief is better or worse than an unjustified true belief. Hence our 
assessments here lie along a fluid and approximate scale. 
Our normative theory should reflect this complex structure, admitting at least four 
groupings of normative properties matching these distinctive profiles. While we may hold that 
these four groupings are interestingly related to one another, we should not conflate them.  
These data are best explained by the position I will develop below: the Teleological 
Account, which identifies okayness with success. For as I will soon argue, the Teleological 
Account not only respects these distinctions but even explains the relevance of epistemic 
goodness, permissibility, and excusability in terms of knowledge. This theory thus underwrites 
a compact account of epistemic normativity. 
 Consider Harry, who applies for Auror training. Harry’s application includes glowing 
recommendations from his Defense against the Dark Arts teachers, a moving essay that 
discusses his battle against Lord Voldemort, and outstanding results from a practical 
examination in which he single-handedly subdued a dementor. However, the malicious Malfoys 
have bribed the admissions committee at the Ministry of Magic, so Harry’s application is 
rejected. How does this application stand with respect to the norms of applying for Auror 
training? 
The application is obviously permissible. It is complete and accurate, and Harry 
submitted it well before the deadline. From a deontological perspective, the application thus 
merits a positive assessment. The application is also very good; any Auror will tell you that it is 
the best of this year’s batch! So from an axiological perspective, the application again merits a 
positive assessment. Still, it also merits a certain negative assessment, for it is a failure: Harry is 
not accepted for Auror training, and any application for Auror training, qua application for 
Auror training, has acceptance as its aim. 
This case highlights another salient normative property: success. An item is successful in 
a domain iff it fulfills its aim in that domain.36 
Harry’s application illustrates two facts about success: that neither permissibility nor 
goodness entails success in a domain. Suppose that Draco Malfoy submits a middling 
                                                 
35 Of course, this claim would be resisted by epistemologists who identify proper belief-forming processes with 
processes that in fact produce knowledge. But I worry that such epistemologists ignore a distinction that we make 
as a matter of course. 
36 Some items have multiple aims within a domain and may be successful in some respects but not others within 
that domain. 
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application that is accepted because of further bribery. Draco’s application illustrates a third 
fact: that an item may be successful without being maximally good.37 
Ordinary practice reflects this normative multidimensionality. Hermione may praise 
Harry from the deontological perspective (‘Sending in that application was the right thing to 
do’) and from the axiological perspective (‘What an outstanding application!’), yet these positive 
remarks are perfectly compatible with negative assessment from the teleological perspective: 
‘Your application failed – you didn’t get into Auror training!’ Applying this framework to the 
epistemic domain, the Teleological Account holds that assertion, action, and belief all aim at 
knowledgeability – or, as I will say more pithily, at knowledge.38 This account thus identifies 
okayness with success: 
 
Assertion Teleology: An assertion that p is epistemically successful iff this assertion is 
knowledge-based. 
 
Action Teleology: A treatment of p as a reason for action is epistemically successful iff 
this treatment is knowledge-based. 
 
Belief Teleology: A belief that p is epistemically successful iff this belief is knowledge.39 
 
According to this theory, both the Gettiered subject’s belief and Harry’s application are 
permissible and good, indeed excellent, in their respective domains. Nevertheless, through no 
fault of the subject, each is a failure. Success requires the aid of a fickle world. 
 The Teleological Account explains the relevance not only of epistemic success (i.e., 
knowledge), but also of epistemic permissibility, excusability, and goodness. For suppose that I 
have an aim that is ongoing, in that I will repeatedly have aims of the same type; external, in 
that the achievement of such aims requires the cooperation of the environment; and social, in 
that I belong to a group that cares about aims of this type. For instance, when I play pool, I aim 
to sink a particular ball or balls, and to continue to do so with each shot I take during the game. 
Doing so depends not only on my skill, but also on external factors such as the levelness of the 
table, the lack of interference by spectators, and so on. And, as a pool player, I belong to a 
community of pool players, spectators, and so on who care about this aim. For any such aim, 
members of the relevant group will by and large benefit from assessing four clusters of 
properties.40 First and foremost, they will of course benefit from attending carefully to the aim 
itself – in this case, whether I sink the ball(s) that I call. But that is not all. 
They will benefit secondly from assessing, roughly, whether the individual uses a proper 
internal process. The cloth on this pool table might be worn, throwing my shots slightly but 
unpredictably off course, or a careless bystander might jostle my elbow. Still, though these 
                                                 
37 In some domains, an item may even succeed despite being bad: even had Draco’s application been awful, a large 
enough bribe would have ensured its success. Below, I will suggest that this cannot occur in the epistemic domain. 
38 For more on the view that knowledge is the aim of belief, see Williamson (2000, p.11), Bird (2007), McHugh 
(2011), Smithies (2012), and Jackson (2012).  
39 While Jackson (2012) and Smithies (2012) defend theories much like the Teleological Account, my arguments 
will be independent of theirs. Smithies argues from the principle that one has justification to act in a certain way iff 
one has justification to believe that it is correct to act in that way. I rely on no such iterated justification principle, 
and indeed Smith (2012) argues persuasively against it. Jackson focuses on explaining how we can rationally act on 
partial rather than full beliefs. Though I am sympathetic to much of what he says, I focus instead on predicting and 
unifying the many dimensions of our epistemic assessments. 
40 Here I take inspiration from Sosa (2007) and from correspondence with John Turri, though my account is quite 
different from either of theirs. 
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unfortunate external circumstances might stop me from achieving my aim, I ought not locate 
the flaw in myself. I should instead focus on using the appropriate type of internal process, a 
process which tends to result in the correct ball or balls being sunk, to do well in the long run. 
Distinguishing internal from external flaws in this fashion will equip me to refine my shooting. 
In short, then, pool players should assess what is permitted, required, or forbidden, relative to the 
aim of sinking pool shots.41 
If someone fails the second assessment, then to fairly apportion blame members of the 
relevant group should thirdly assess, roughly, whether she could reasonably have been expected to do 
better. Suppose that you and I are partners in a pool match, but I have been shooting poorly. If I 
am a beginner, or if I am suffering a panic attack, then perhaps you should not blame me for my 
bad performance, but blame is warranted if I have no such excuse. In short, then, pool players 
should assess the excusability of what is forbidden relative to an aim. 
Fourth, a standard heuristic for achieving an aim is to break it into more manageable 
parts. Whether or not I make my shot, pool players can observe whether I meet salient 
conditions typically or necessarily required to achieve that aim, like calling the proper pocket and 
hitting the correct ball at the correct angle. Relatedly, they can assess whether I have salient 
properties which dispose me to achieve my aim, like shooting with a still elbow, or which dispose me to 
become disposed to achieve my aim, like practicing difficult shots regularly. Such properties are 
numerous and scattered, and this diversity will be reflected in our assessments. In short, then, 
pool players should assess what is good, neutral, or bad relative to this aim. 
The aim of knowledge is ongoing, since we aim to achieve it in our many future 
assertions, actions, and beliefs; external, since (as Gettier cases remind us) knowledgeability 
requires the cooperation of the environment; and social, since it is an object of collective 
concern. In the wake of knowledge, we should thus expect to find assessments of permissibility, 
excusability, and goodness fitting the pattern I have described. 
We find exactly this. As I remarked at the beginning of this section, we distinguish 
knowledgeable beliefs, Gettiered beliefs, etc., from beliefs generated by wishful thinking, fallacious 
inferences, etc., focusing on whether the assessed individual uses an epistemically proper internal 
process – roughly, an internal process suited to generating knowledge. If this test is negative, 
we then consider extenuating circumstances, focusing on, roughly, whether we could 
reasonably have expected her to do better. Finally, we laud a diverse mix of salient properties 
related to knowledge, including necessary conditions on knowledge, such as truth, justification, 
evidence; dispositions likely to lead to knowledge, such as thoroughness in gathering evidence; 
dispositions to become disposed to achieve knowledge, such as willingness to revise one’s 
epistemic practices; and of course knowledge itself. The Teleological Account thus not only 
respects these many dimensions of epistemic normativity, but further predicts their specific 
contours. It puts knowledge first, but without the procrustean treatment often associated with 
that slogan. 
But the aim of knowledge is in one important respect not analogous to the aim of 
sinking a pool shot: in the epistemic case, the link between permissible processes and fulfillment 
of the aim is constitutive rather than merely causal. Though it is unlikely, I might sink a pool 
shot via an impermissible process such as careless but lucky shooting. Such possibilities exist 
because the aim of sinking a pool shot is metaphysically independent from the permissible 
processes for achieving that aim; in other words, the relationship between permissible methods 
                                                 
41 In the context of pool, the term “permissibility” may refer either to deontological acceptability given the rules of 
pool or to deontological acceptability given the aim of pool. My meaning is obviously the latter, which is also 
naturally expressed with terms like “should.” 
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and success is merely causal and contingent. In the case of knowledge, however, it is part of the 
aim itself that one’s method be permissible, for a true belief based on insufficient evidence or 
formed via bad reasoning cannot qualify as knowledge. Here, then, the relationship between 
permissible processes and success is one of metaphysical necessity. 
As a consequence, the normative structure generated by the aim of knowledge differs, in 
subtle but important ways, from the normative structure generated by the aim of sinking pool 
shots. Negative assessment of someone’s processes in pool can co-exist with positive 
assessment of her results: “I admit that your fancy trick shot sunk the ball, but you just got 
lucky! You should have taken the safe and easy shot instead of showing off.” But such situations 
cannot arise regarding the aim of knowledge, as success in the absence of a permissible process 
is impossible. 
In addition, since the permissibility of a process of pool shooting depends on its causal 
relationship to the aim of sinking pool shots, a pool player may take shots on purely 
probabilistic grounds. She may take a particular shot rather than another because she knows 
that she is more likely to sink the first shot, for example, even if she in fact misses the first shot 
and would by chance have sunk the second. Similarly, she may take a low-probability shot 
simply because she has no better shot available. But a process of belief formation is permissible 
in virtue of its constitutive relationship to the aim of knowledge; a merely probabilistic 
relationship is not enough, and indeed not even possible in the same sense. For if I believe, even 
truly, that a particular ticket has not won a fair lottery on the grounds that its chance of being 
selected is only 10%, my improper method of belief formation disbars me from achieving 
knowledge.42,43  
Though the constitutive rather than causal relationship between permissibility and 
success is a special feature of the epistemic case, once it is taken into account our varied 
epistemic assessments fall neatly into the explanatory net of the Teleological Account. 
 
 
5. The Teleological Account and its rivals 
 
In letter, the Deontological, Strict Axiological, and Permissive Axiological Accounts are each 
compatible with the Teleological Account, since it is conceptually coherent to identify epistemic 
success with epistemic permissibility, epistemic goodness simpliciter, or a particular higher 
degree of epistemic goodness.44  I have no quarrel with the combination of the Permissive 
Axiological Account and the Teleological Account, though I will show at the end of this section 
that unlike the bare Permissive Axiological Account, the pluralistic Teleological Account 
explains the distinctive normative salience of knowledge. But I resist any attempt to combine 
the Teleological Account with the Deontological or Strict Axiological Accounts, for I have 
argued that these accounts blur distinct aspects of our epistemic assessments. I endorse only 
the fiercely pluralistic version of the Teleological Account which sharply distinguishes at least 
four categories of epistemic assessment. In addition, I resist for the further reason that any such 
combination would expose the Teleological Account to the objections that I have raised against 
                                                 
42 Smith (2010) and (2014) makes this point clearly. 
43 Though I hold that knowledge cannot be based on merely probabilistic evidence, I am non-committal about the 
possibility (defended by Williamson (2011) and (forthcoming)) of “improbable knowing,” i.e., of cases in which the 
subject knows that p even though the epistemic probability that she knows that p given her evidence is low. 
44  Williamson (2000) suggests combining parts of the Teleological Account with parts of the Deontological 
Account, and John Turri (personal correspondence) does the same for the Strict Axiological Account. 
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the Deontological or Strict Axiological Accounts. But, as I will next show, the pluralistic 
Teleological Account is not vulnerable to those objections. 
Given the minimal assumption that some justified beliefs are not knowledge, I objected 
that the Deontological Account is incompatible with the Belief-Belief Link, according to which 
if a belief that p is epistemically justified, then it is epistemically permissible. But the 
Teleological Account is perfectly compatible with the Belief-Belief Link. To be sure, the 
Teleological Account entails that any non-knowledgeable belief is thereby epistemically 
unsuccessful. This verdict is reasonable, since we can appropriately meet any such belief with 
negative assessments like, ‘You don’t know that!,’ but this in no way conflicts with the Belief-
Belief Link, for an item may be permissible despite being unsuccessful in a domain. Thus, the 
teleologist may hold that some beliefs which fall short of knowledge are epistemically 
permissible despite being epistemically unsuccessful. On this score, the teleologist, like the 
strict axiologist, has a leg up on the deontologist. 
Recall the Strict Axiological Account, on which non-knowledgeable beliefs, assertions, 
and actions are never epistemically good overall. This account must deny that true or justified 
beliefs falling short of knowledge, as well as assertions and actions properly based on them, can 
sometimes be epistemically good overall. On one version of the account, truth and justification 
are not epistemic goods at all, while on another, lack of knowledge is always epistemically bad, 
and indeed always epistemically bad enough to outweigh the epistemic goods of truth and 
justification. Either commitment is implausible. 
The Teleological Account is burdened with no such commitments. For in a given 
domain, something may be good in some respect, and even good overall, while still being 
unsuccessful. Thus, to avoid the first commitment, the Success Theorist may hold that true or 
justified beliefs, and assertions and actions properly based on them, are epistemically good in 
some respect. To avoid the second commitment, the Success Theorist may further hold that 
lack of knowledge need not be epistemically bad enough to outweigh the epistemic goods 
provided by truth or justification, and she may even hold that lack of knowledge need not be 
epistemically bad at all. Thus, she may hold that some true or justified beliefs that fall short of 
knowledge, and assertions and actions properly based on them, are epistemically good overall. 
 Finally, recall my central objection to the Permissive Axiological Account, which holds 
that knowledgeable assertions, actions, and beliefs reach a particular degree of epistemic 
goodness which their non-knowledgeable counterparts never do. This theory falters at 
explaining why knowledge is so normatively salient, given that knowledge falls in the middle of 
the long scale of epistemic goodness. Beliefs that are barely knowledge are a fine example: 
while they are epistemically good, they are epistemically better than some epistemically good 
beliefs and epistemically worse than others. From the perspective of the permissive axiologist, 
our practice of setting knowledge as an epistemic standard is deeply arbitrary. 
 The Teleological Account is perfectly compatible with the Permissive Axiological 
Account, but it readily explains the distinctive normative salience of knowledge: knowledge is 
distinctively normatively salient because it sets the standard of epistemic success. Beliefs that are 
knowledge, and assertions/actions properly based on them, are epistemic successes, while all 
other beliefs, assertions, and actions are epistemic failures.45 Analogously, winning games is the 
aim of a basketball team qua basketball team. Because a team must score more points than the 
opposition to achieve this aim, our assessments of basketball teams are especially sensitive to 
the property of scoring at least one point more than the opposing team. This property is not salient 
                                                 
45 At least, they fail with respect to the epistemic aim of knowledge. Perhaps there are additional epistemic aims as 
well. 
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merely because it marks a particular degree of basketball goodness, for many nearby properties 
to which we pay far less attention – scoring at least two points more than the opposing team, scoring 
at least three points more than the opposing team, etc. – also mark particular degrees of basketball 
goodness. We instead single out the property of scoring at least one point more than the 
opposing team because to instantiate it is to achieve the aim of basketball. 
In general, then, the aim of any item of a given kind is salient in assessing that item qua 
member of that kind. Hence our emphasis on knowledge, even when barely obtained, over 
many nearby epistemically good properties – not because knowledge marks a particular degree 
of goodness (though it does), but because knowledge is an epistemic aim. 
 
 
6. The source of epistemic teleology 
 
In virtue of what do assertion, action, and belief aim at knowledge? Many aims exist because of 
our individual intentions. When I intend to sit on a chair but land ignominiously on the floor, 
my action fails because it misses the aim that I have set. But the aim of knowledge cannot be 
like this, for we rarely intend to meet any knowledge norm when we assert, act, or believe. We 
are not such deliberate creatures.  
 Other aims, however, exist because of our communal intentions. Suppose that George 
Weasley applies for Auror training as part of a crude practical joke: he slips a stink bomb into 
the application envelope. Though he knows perfectly well that his application will be rejected 
and is indifferent to this result, George’s rejected application still fails qua application, for the 
aim of this Auror application qua application is determined not by George’s intentions but by 
the community of applicants, admission committees, and so on. Indeed, qua application, 
George’s application aims at acceptance even though no individual or group of individuals ever 
intends for it to be accepted. It has this aim simply in virtue of being an application. 
 Perhaps the aim of knowledge is like this. On this communal account, our communal 
intentions for our assertions, actions, and beliefs to be appropriately related to knowledge set 
an aim for these items. This aim is tacit, manifested in our patterns of assessment but rarely 
stated outright. It extends even to those beliefs which no one specifically intends to be 
knowledge, and even to those assertions and actions which no one specifically intends to be 
knowledge-based. 
 Yet some aims are set, not by human intentions, but by nature; in particular, by 
evolution. My heart has the proper function of pumping blood, and my liver of filtering toxins; 
as a consequence, these items have corresponding aims. These aims do not depend on my 
intentions or those of my community, but rather on the fact that the hearts and livers of my 
ancestors pumped blood and filtered toxins, thereby helping my ancestors to survive and 
reproduce.46 According to the proper functional account, evolution also sets proper functions, 
and hence aims, for our capacities to assert, act, and believe. Knowledge is one such aim, since 
our ancestors survived and reproduced partly because of those assertions, actions, and beliefs 
which were knowledgeable. 
 The proper functionalist should admit that assertion, action, and belief have aims 
distinct from, and sometimes even incompatible with, knowledge. For our evolved capacities 
are complex and often messy, including not only aims nested within other aims, but also 
                                                 
46 Though for purposes of vivid presentation I have filled in the details with the etiological theory of proper 
function developed by Wright (1975), Millikan (1984) and (1993), and Neander (1991), most alternative accounts 
of proper function can reasonably be substituted in its place. 
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competing aims. The aim of knowledge is no different. It is nested within other aims: belief 
aims not only to be knowledge, but also to combine with desire in effective action. And the aim 
of knowledge sometimes competes with other aims: when my unjustified belief that I will 
recover from cancer in fact helps my recovery, my belief fulfills one such competing aim. None 
of this should distract from the fact that knowledge is an important node in the tangled web of 
aims for assertion, action, and belief. 
Officially, I remain neutral between the communal and proper functional accounts of the 
source of the knowledge aim, and indeed I leave open the possibility of some combination of 
these accounts.47 Regardless, the Teleological Account takes only one notion as primitive: the 
notion of an aim. It provides paradigmatic examples of and theoretical remarks about aims 
without independently defining them, and it defines success in terms of aims. Assertion, action, 
and belief have many aims, one of which is the distinctively epistemic (rather than, say, 
practical) aim of knowledge.48 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Compelling data underwrite the Knowledge Account, but extant deontological and axiological 
formulations of it are deeply dissatisfying. Their cardinal sin is one of fixation: while they 
rightly recognize the centrality of knowledge, they do not do justice to the entire complement 
of epistemic norms. 
My own view of the structure of epistemic normativity has instead been full-throated in 
its pluralism. I have claimed that knowledge sets the norm of epistemic success, and with this 
claim my opponents may agree in spirit and perhaps even in letter. But my innovation has been 
to treat this norm of knowledge as a principle of organization, rather than one of reduction, for 
other epistemic norms. In particular, I have held that epistemic permissibility requires, roughly, 
the use of an internal process suited to generating knowledge; that the impermissible is still 
epistemically excusable if, roughly, the subject could not reasonably have been expected to do 
better; and that epistemic goodness attaches to a disunified range of properties saliently related 
to knowledge, including of course knowledge itself, but also necessary conditions on knowledge, 
dispositions likely to lead to knowledge, and dispositions to become disposed to achieve 
knowledge. 
This Teleological Account has none of the shortcomings of its rivals but all of their 
merits and more. It explains the importance, and even predicts the specific contours, of 
epistemic permissibility, excusability, and goodness, and it further organizes these predictions 
in a compact theoretical framework in which knowledge has pride of place. I conclude that it is 
the best version of the Knowledge Account. 
 
  
                                                 
47 Unofficially, I incline towards a pure proper functional account for belief and action and a combined proper 
functional and communal account for assertion. 
48 Per the discussion of epistemic and non-epistemic norms in §1. 
 18 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: For their remarkably extensive comments on this paper, I must 
specially thank Nico Silins and John Turri. I have also profited greatly from discussion or 
correspondence on these topics with Andrew Bailey, Amber Carpenter, Jay Garfield, Tamar 
Gendler, Alexander Jackson, Peter Kung, Sam Liao, Cathay Liu, Michael Pelczar, Martin Smith, 
Matt Walker, and participants in the Yale-NUS reading group. This work was supported by 
Yale-NUS College through grant number R-607-263-010-121. 
  
 19 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bird, A. (2007). “Justified judging.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 81-110. 
Brown, J. (2008a). “The knowledge norm for assertion.” Philosophical Issues 18: 89-103. 
Brown, J. (2008b). “Subject-sensitive invariantism and the knowledge norm for practical 
reasoning.” Noûs 42 (2): 167-189. 
Brown, J. (2010). “Knowledge and assertion.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 
549-566. 
Brown, J. (2012). “Assertion and practical reasoning: common or divergent epistemic 
standards?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 123-157. 
Cohen, S. and Comesaña, J. (2013). “Williamson on Gettier cases and epistemic logic.” Inquiry 
56 (1): 15-29. 
Conee, E. and Feldman, R. (1985). “Evidentialism.” Philosophical Studies 48: 15-34. 
DeRose, K. (1991). “Epistemic possibilities.” Philosophical Review 100 (4): 581-605. 
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2002). “Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.” Philosophical Review 
111 (1): 67-94. 
Gerken, M. (2011). “Warrant and action.” Synthese 178: 529-547. 
Gettier, E. (1963). “Is justified true belief knowledge?” Analysis 23 (6): 121-123. 
Goldman, A. (1976). “Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 73 (20): 
771-791. 
Goldman, Alvin I. (1979). “What is justified belief?” In Justification and Knowledge, ed. G. 
Pappas (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company). 
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hawthorne, J. and Stanley, J. (2008). “Knowledge and action.” Journal of Philosophy 105 (10): 
571-590. 
Hellie, B. (2011). “There it is.” Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 110-164. 
Jackson, A. (2012). “Two ways to put knowledge first.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2): 
353-369. 
Lackey, J. (2007). “Norms of assertion.” Noûs 41 (4): 594-626. 
Lackey, J. (2010). “Acting on knowledge.” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 361-382. 
Leite, A. (2013). “But that’s not evidence; it’s not even true!” Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250): 81-
104. 
Maitra, I. and Weatherson, B. (2010). “Assertion, knowledge, and action.” Philosophical Studies 
149 (1): 99-118. 
McHugh, C. (2011). “What do we aim at when we believe?” dialectica 65 (3): 369-392. 
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press. 
Millikan, R. (1993). White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
Moore, G. E. (1962). Commonplace Book: 1919-1953. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Moss, S. (2013). “Epistemology formalized.” Philosophical Review 122 (1): 1-43. 
Neander, K. (1991). “Functions as selected effects: the conceptual analyst’s defense.” Philosophy 
of Science 58 (2): 168-184. 
Neta, R. (2009). “Treating something as a reason for action.” Noûs 43 (4): 684-699. 
Slote, M. (1979). “Assertion and belief.” In Papers on Language and Logic, ed. J. Dancy (Keele: 
Keele University Library). 
Smith, M. (2010). “What else justification could be.” Noûs 44 (1):10-31. 
Smith, M. (2012). “Some thoughts on the JK-rule.” Noûs 46 (4): 791-802. 
 20 
 
Smith, M. (2014). “Knowledge, justification and normative coincidence.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 89 (2): 273-295. 
Smithies, D. (2012). “The normative role of knowledge.” Noûs 46 (2): 265-288. 
Sosa, D. (2009). “Dubious assertions.” Philosophical Studies 146: 269-272. 
Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stanley, J. (2008). “Knowledge and certainty.” Philosophical Issues 18 (1): 35-57. 
Sutton, J. (2005). “Stick to what you know.” Noûs 39 (3): 359-396. 
Turri, J. (2010). “Prompting challenges.” Analysis 70 (3): 456-462. 
Turri, J. (2011). “The express knowledge account of assertion.” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 89 (1): 37-45. 
Turri, J. (2014). “Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.” Philosophical Studies. 
Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Weatherson, B. (2003). “What good are counterexamples?” Philosophical Studies 115 (1): 1-31. 
Weiner, M. (2005). “Must we know what we say?” Philosophical Review 114 (2): 227-251. 
Weisberg, J. (2013). “Knowledge in action.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (22): 1-23. 
Whitcomb, D. (forthcoming). “Can there be a knowledge-first ethics of belief?” In The Ethics of 
Belief: Individual and Social, eds. J. Matheson and R. Vitz (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, T. (2011). “Improbable knowing.” In Evidentialism and its Discontents, ed. T. 
Dougherty (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Williamson, T. (2013a). “Gettier cases in epistemic logic.” Inquiry 56 (1): 1-14. 
Williamson, T. (2013b). “Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on 
Gettier cases an epistemic logic.” Inquiry 56 (1): 77-96. 
Williamson, T. (forthcoming). “Very improbable knowing.” Erkenntnis. 
Wright, L. (1973). “Functions.” Philosophical Review 82 (2): 139-168. 
 
 
 
